Low carbon society objectives have won a large support from the political elites in the EU and China and have become routinely invoked on both sides as the most promising response to the challenge of climate change. Praised as a common response to a common challenge, these political endorsements in both regions have raised enormous expectations of collective action and increased bilateral and strategic cooperation on climate change and energy security. These hopes have been embodied in the EU-China partnership on climate change. Yet, whereas some cooperation has indeed taken place, paradoxically this convergence of policy goals has also led to growing trade and political tensions. Therefore, this paper asks whether the emphasis on low carbon development strategies in China and the EU is actually capable of triggering the expected benefits for "win-win" cooperation on climate change. It argues that these contradictory patterns of cooperation and competition illustrate a tension between environmental objectives and economic competitiveness. This tension is inherent in the lowcarbon society concept and has not been sufficiently appraised in EU-China relations. In particular, it demonstrates that the threats of 'trade wars' over low-carbon energy technologies indicate a growing tendency to construe these technologies as strategic national resources and crucial assets for ensuring national economic growth and jobs, tilting the balance towards multipolar competition for emerging markets and clouding the horizon of the 'green' "end of history".
Introduction
Low carbon society objectives have won substantial support from political elites in the EU and China and have become routinely invoked on both sides as the most promising response to the challenge of climate change. The EU, which has assumed a leadership role in global climate governance since the inception of the multilateral regime at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, has fully integrated the 'low carbon society' vocabulary into its 2020 development strategy aimed at delivering "smart sustainable and inclusive growth"
1 . It is also the preferred path towards achieving EU's ambition to reduce greenhouse gases emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050.
China, which since 2008 has surpassed the US as the world's largest emitter of GHG, has also hailed the pursuit of a "low carbon economy" as the future development path for China. The Praised as a common response to a common challenge, these political endorsements in Europe and China have raised enormous expectations of collective action and increased bilateral and 1 EU 2020 Strategy, see website: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-anutshell/priorities/index_en.htm 2 Xinhua, "China puts more money in renewable energy resources", 5 December 2011; Li Keqiang Opening Speech at the annual meeting of the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED), "A Modern China with Ecological Progress", 12 December 2012, accessed on http://www.cciced.net/encciced/newscenter/pn/201212/t20121214_243776.html, retrieved on 17 strategic cooperation on climate change and energy security 3 , which have been embodied in the EU-China partnership on climate change and other sectorial dialogues.
Yet, whereas some cooperation has indeed taken place and European companies have been among the first to seize the issuing market opportunities (B. Buijs, L van Geuns, 2012) , this convergence of policy goals has paradoxically also led to growing trade and political tensions.
More specifically, the promotion of low carbon energy technologies and other carbon pricing instruments have triggered significant, still unresolved, trade and political disputes.
Following tensions on subsidies for wind turbines, and the still on-going dispute on the inclusion of international aviation in the EU ETS 4 , the latest opus came about in September 2012, when the European Commission launched both anti-dumping and anti-subsidy investigations into Solar panels' imports from China, after the US began imposing duties between 30-250% on the same imports from China. The escalating dispute between the two primary markets for low carbon technologies may read as a signal of a global trend towards a "race for green markets" and correlated "green protectionism" which may hinder the desirable large-scale, cost-efficient deployment of these technologies.
In such a context, it is worth questioning whether the emphasis on low carbon development strategies in China and the EU is actually capable of triggering the expected benefits for "winwin" cooperation on climate change. This paper argues that the contradictory patterns of international cooperation and competition illustrate a tension between environmental objectives and economic competitiveness. This tension, which is inherent in the 'low carbon economy' concept, has not been sufficiently analysed in EU-China relations. Since the launch of China's reform and opening up period in the late 1970s, the Chinese leadership has constantly subordinated environmental issues to its economic development goals. Even though environmental degradation and climate change have gained political clout, the leadership has made clear that economic development remained the ultimate priority for the developing state. The 'low carbon society' has thus unsurprisingly been formulated as the way to "accelerate the shift in its economic 3 EU China Joint Declaration on Energy Security, Outcome of the 1 st EU-China Energy Dialogue, Brussels, 3 May 2012 4 Trade tensions have also previously emerged on Chinese subsidies of wind turbines. Although in that case the EU did not launch a probe, it contributed to the investigations undertaken in the United States. Furthermore, the lingering dispute on the inclusion of emissions from international aviation in the EU ETS, denounced as an illegal carbon tax by China and other countries, has also threatened of using trade retaliatory measures. The first section of this paper details the low carbon objectives adopted by the EU and China and pinpoints the commonalities of language and measures in both region's low carbon development strategies. Subsequently, the second section dwells on the dialectic of competition and cooperation inherent in the low carbon concept and how it affects EU-China relations on climate change in the absence of a coherent multilateral framework supporting cooperation on this issue. The solar panel dispute is used as a case study of this dilemma.
I.
Low carbon objectives in the EU and China
The Low Carbon Economy concept and its ramifications
Neither China nor the EU have properly defined "low carbon economy" or "low carbon summarised by the Stern Review in the following terms: "tackling climate change is the progrowth strategy for the longer term, and it can be done in a way that does not cap the aspirations for growth of rich or poor countries 12 ." But this 'positive-sum' relies on the prerequisite that 'low carbon policies' uphold the promises of the "Green New Deal 13 ": a new technological frontier and increased social welfare through jobs creation.
The Low carbon economy strategies of Europe and China
While the EU took a leadership role in global Climate governance a long time before China became a tangible international actor in this field, it is interesting to note that 'low carbon' 22 . This characteristic appears even more strikingly by looking at the green policies adopted by some of EU member states, who retain most of the power to determine their 'green' domestic industrial and tax policies. For instance, Schreur explains that Germany'sEurope's 'role-model' economy throughout the economic crisis -"success story" in renewables promotion, which lifted Germany to become the world's 1 st exporter of renewables by 2010, has been claimed to have fostered the creation of over 370 000 jobs in this emerging industry. She also underlines the consensus in the German society that "innovation in environmental and clean energy technologies is a means of creating new jobs, modernizing the economy, and preparing Germany for the future" (Schreur, 2012) .
In China, the endorsement of the 'low carbon society' concept by the State leadership has spurred academic discussions around its meaning and implications (Hu, Zhou et al, 2011; Pan, Zhuang et al 2010; Jiang et al, 2010 , Z. Zhang, 2010 Cai et al, 2012) . A direct result of this has been that an unprecedented number of research institutes have sprung up to build scientific capacity in this field following the adoption of China's first "Climate Change White At the central level, the Work Plan for GHG emissions control during the 12 FYP period clearly states that 'China should view proactive responses to climate change as an important strategy for economic and social development as well as an important opportunity for accelerating the transformation of the economic development mode and for adjusting the economic structures and promoting a new industrial revolution". To this end, the plan quotes 7 "strategic emerging industries", including renewable industries, as a priority for government action. These industries should make up 8% to China's total GDP by 2015 (from less than 2% in 2011). This, together with massive investment in R&D and the constant push, through various means, to encourage or compel technology transfers from developed markets clearly demonstrate the Chinese government's ambition to transform the country into a technology world leader, starting with renewables and other clean technologies. At the local level also, the link between energy efficiency and renewable energy promotion on the one hand, and economic growth and local revenue on the other hand, has helped transforming climate change from a distant global issue into a local priority (Qi, Ma et al, 2008) . But this is not unique to China. A comparative study by the Climate Policy Initiative of German and Chinese solar industry policies found that economic incentives were also an important explanatory factor for the solar industry expansion in Germany 24 .
From this brief account, it appears that the lure of the "new green industrial revolution" and its linkage to enhanced economic competitiveness in the globalised economy and continued economic growth is a key common rational underlying the promotion of a low carbon economy in Europe and China, although expected short-term benefits may be different ('green jobs' for Europe and for China, leapfrogging from its current 'black' industrial revolution directly into the 'green industrial revolution'). But whereas convergence on climate goals can be expected to trigger international cooperation, enhancing the competitiveness of national industries is likely to lead more towards a 'zero sum game' competition. China has been keen on promoting its national interests through both approaches (Bo, Chen, 2009 ) consistent with its 'practical' approach to "proactively attract and absorb advanced international technologies, and learn from and draw on successful international experience" 25 .
Against a background of staging multilateral negotiations, the second model of cooperation has raised increasing expectations, especially since it was presented with an additional economic argument, according to which renewable technologies cooperation would allow investors to mitigate investment costs, realise global economies of scale in production, boost mass production and lower prices, with making these technologies affordable for the desirable mass-consumption their ultimate goal (Stern Review, 2006 , Hourcade, Shukla, 2013 The adoption of similar "low carbon development" domestic strategies in Europe and China has blown fresh hopes of cooperation following the bitter mutual disappointments of the persuasive argument for bilateral EU-China low carbon cooperation has been the high potential for business opportunities between the world's two largest markets, which already enjoy the world's most prominent inter-regional trade relation 33 . In addition, the 'strategic aspect' of the bilateral cooperation also resides in the hope that it will induce rapprochement in the multilateral framework 34 .
Thus, both at the bilateral and global levels, advocacies for cooperation on low-carbon technologies have monopolised the entire official discourse on climate governance, particularly in EU-China relations. While these political efforts and experts recommendations are perfectly justified and legitimate from an environmental point of view, they have also contributed to creating a political taboo around the issue of potential national competition in the field of renewable energy. This peculiarity is not found in other related areas of international relations where competition among nations is instead expected and politically assumed, for instance in the domains of energy security and trade relations at large 35 . The failure to take into account this dimension goes some way towards explaining the surprise and political unease created by the rising trade frictions in this field.
Increasing polar competition affecting EU-China relations on climate change: the example of solar panels
The Stern review took a neoliberal vision of the way the global market can address the world's "biggest market failure" and solve the development/climate equation through the diffusion of technology innovations. It completely ignored the potential risks of strategic competition for global markets in this emerging, potentially extremely lucrative industrial sector. Taking as its starting point the fact that technologies would mainly be developed by private entrepreneurs, it saw the role of States as mere support platforms for technological development through regulatory measures and investment incentives. But, the relationship between governments and national industries is much more complex (Breslin S, 2010) , particularly with regard to those that are still in a very early development stage and require time and investment to become economically viable on the free market, such a renewable energy technologies.
As shown in previous sections, Europe's and China's low carbon strategies both place high hopes in the development of their domestic low carbon industry. In this regard, more attention should be paid to the fact that a possible negative interplay of low carbon policies, industrial policies and trade policies can lead to important frictions between these economic powers.
This mainly takes two forms: Firstly, the race to push each economy's domestic industry to the top export leadership in the emerging global market in the low carbon field increases pressure on governments to intervene and proactively support their 'champions' against foreign competitors. This runs the risk of raising trade barriers, as each market will face increasing domestic pressure for protection from foreign competitors. Secondly and consequently, fears of carbon leakage and unfair trade that threatens the expected returns on investment from the green 'new deal', associated with fears to be on the 'loser side' of the this new globalisation can also pressure against free trade. In Europe, but also elsewhere, the economic crisis has made it crucial for the economic benefits of the 'green industrial revolution' to produce dividends at home, measured in terms of economic activity, jobs and revenue for the state. As an example of how this translates into policy documents, the EU Energy Roadmap warns against a "potential trade-off between climate change policies and competitiveness" if the EU was alone to take regulatory measures to price and curb CO2
emissions. The EU, it argues, must safeguard the competitiveness of its domestic industry against "carbon leakage". Consequently, the Commission states that "opportunities for trade and cooperation will require a level playing field beyond the European border 36 ". According to these companies, Europe is China's single most important export market, 
III. Conclusions
The provocative question raised in the introduction of this paper was not meant to insinuate that low carbon policies are wrong or should not be pursued. Instead the above argumentation tried to raise attention to a series of conflicts inherent in the low carbon economy that need to be fully appraised by policy makers, in order to avoid that trade tensions eventually jeopardise the attainment of legitimate climate protection and development goals. The contribution that this preliminary research wishes to make can be summarised as follow.
Firstly, the convergence of policy agendas towards a 'low carbon' economic development goal in all major economies will not automatically lead to a 'positive sum' game of cooperative actions at the international level. The low carbon society concept has been purposely kept sufficiently broad to embrace a variety of values and interests, so that its unilateral endorsement by individual governments is insufficient to propel collective action or alleviate the global equity challenges faced in the multilateral negotiations.
Secondly, the race for markets and intertwined industrial and national interests push major economies towards zero sum games calculus, which indicates that hopes for a decentralized climate governance based on the unimpeded deployment of low carbon technologies can be delusive. Furthermore, relying on trade rules to solve the inevitable trade conflicts may prove increasingly difficult, as the multiple trades-offs between free trade, the environment and job markets demand a legitimate and transparent political settlement.
Thirdly, in this complex interplay, several areas deserve more thorough attention from experts communities and policy-makers. One relates to the role of private transnational actors. It has not escaped media attention that "EU Prosun" was led by the same German multinational, SolarWorld, who had originated the probe in the United States. Considering the fact that the renewable industry is born in the age of globalisation, a closer monitoring of the transnational patterns of chain production will help identify the private interests behind the probes and better assert the establishment of the "level playing field" for the emerging market's players.
In addition, whereas this paper has focused on the EU level, it is also well-established that the policies and economic interests of EU member states vis a vis China are not always congruent, as is also true of their low carbon strategies. Poland for instance vocally resisted the adoption of EU energy roadmap 2050. Others have hinted that the EU-China solar dispute was in fact a German affair, despite Ms Merkel's attempts to present it as a European consensus 59 .
Exploring how member states' low carbon policies diverge would contribute to drawing a more accurate, if more complex, etat des lieux of the relation with China.
59 Reuters, "Merkel wants dialogue to solve China-Europe solar panels dispute", 17 September 2012 20
Finally, this paper has focused on the "industrial" facet of low carbon policies. However, another area of potential conflict among nations concerns the regulation of markets for climate mitigation purpose (carbon trading, carbon taxation, feed-in tariffs and other priceincentives). As the on-going dispute on the inclusion of international aviation in the European ETS has shown 60 , different methods of pricing carbon emissions have also triggered trade disputes. In this regard, the fresh announcement by China's Ministry of Finance that it will soon introduce a domestic carbon tax 61 is likely to raise concerns among foreign investors and their governments. All these areas of potential tensions require cool-headed analysis to be carried out -ideally-without the hindrance of either "China threat" or "low carbon revolution" ideological bias. 
